MIT Philosophy Essay Contest                                                                                                                               Chance J. Hernandez                       

 

 

Critique Of The Argument From Cosmological Fine Tuning

 

 

In this paper, I will argue that Roger White’s Argument from Cosmological Fine-Tuning contains a critical flaw and preemptively address possible objections. White argues that, given the statistical unlikelihood of our universe’s life-permitting features by chance, the best explanation for our existence is an agent: ie the best answer to our existence currently is a creator who created us. Yet, for some reason, most of the universe seemingly remains devoid of any life (let alone developed life forms) and is completely inhospitable.

 

In the Argument from Cosmological Fine-Tuning, White argues that the fact of our existence requires an explanation due to its high improbability. He asserts that the universal constants (such as the speed of light and the Planck constant) are so finely tuned that if they were off by even a minute amount, the conditions necessary for life would not be present. He then offers that the most likely and satisfying conclusion for the universe’s habitability is that it was fine tuned specifically to permit life. His argument concludes that the universe’s life-permitting nature provides significant evidential support for theism. It is worth reading White’s syllogistically precise argument in his own words:

 

1. If a fact E that we observe stands in need of explanation, and hypothesis H provides asatisfactory explanation of E and one that is better than any alternative explanationavailable, then E provides significant evidential support for H.

 

2. That our universe is hospitable to life stands in need of explanation.

 

3. That God adjusted the constants to allow for life to develop provides a satisfactory explanation for why our universe is life-permitting.

 

4. There is no comparably satisfying explanation of this fact available.

 

5. Therefore, that our universe is life-permitting provides significant evidential support for theism.

 

White’s argument assumes that God fine-tuned the constants of the universe specifically to allow life to flourish, as even a slight deviation would render life impossible. However, this raises a serious issue: if God went to such lengths to create life, why then is the universe overwhelmingly inhospitable to it? The vast majority of the universe is composed of dark matter and dark energy, which make up approximately 85% of its total content, leaving most of the cosmos inhospitable to life as we know it —-conditions where life as we know it cannot exist. Only a tiny fraction of planets, such as Earth, support the possibility of life. This stands in direct contradiction to the supposed purpose of fine-tuning which is, according to White, to allow for life. This can be understood more clearly when laid out syllogistically as shown below:

 

 

1. If God exists with the intention of creating a habitable universe it should be largely habitable.

 

2. God fine-tunes the universal constants to allow for life.

 

3. Life exists on Earth.

 

4. Most of the universe remains utterly uninhabitable, comprised of dark matter and energy with only a tiny fraction of it supporting the chance for life to evolve and develop.

 

5. Life on Earth exists in a very short timeframe, relative to the age of the rest of the universe. Therefore, it is illogical that God adjusted the constants to allow for life, but for some reason only allowed it in a very small pocket of time and space.

 

This, I believe, highlights the incongruity of his argument, where God’s purpose in “fine-tuning” the universal constants was to allow for life, but, in actuality, it seems there is an exceedingly small amount of conditions allowing for the development of complex life. White’s argument is vague on what type of life he is referring to (simple single-celled organisms, or complex species like humans), which somewhat undermines his argument due to its lack of specificity. So now I will seek to provide a remedy to his vagueness and support the notion that complex life is the only kind that holds significance about the Fine-Tuning Argument.

 

Though some may object to my claims and say something to the effect of, "It’s highly plausible that the ingredients necessary for microbial life, such as amino acids and water, exist abundantly across the universe, especially on exoplanets in the habitable zones of other stars.”The issue with this rebuttal lies in the fact that, even if simple microbial life, such as bacteria, were to exist throughout the universe, it would: 1) not be of theological or moral significance in the context of the Fine-Tuning Argument; and 2) the primitive life forms would likely not have the capacity to evolve into more advanced organisms due to the occurrence of extinction level extraterrestrial events.

 

On my first point, microbial life forms (a broad category that includes bacteria, archaea, and other simple life forms) lack the capacity for consciousness and self-reflection, as well as rationality, which suggests they hold minimal moral worth within the context of the Fine-Tuning Argument, due to the lack of many capacities commonly viewed as necessary for moral significance. For a creature to have moral worth and abilities, it must have the capacity for conscious thought, rational actions, and self-reflection. Without these, they lack several central tenets integral to many philosophical frameworks, and thus, have little value.

 

They also lack theological significance. Throughout many Western religious cultures (such as Islam, Christianity, and Judaism), what gives us value is our ability to make free choices out of our agency, uninfluenced by outside forces. Microbial life is too simplistic to even feign the ability to exercise any of these functions. The purpose for life’s permissibility and creation in religious contexts is often tied to a higher purpose and/or intimate connection to God. However as previously stated, microbial life forms lack these capacities. So even in a religious context, microbial life cannot be shown to have value in terms of the FTA.

 

The next argument against their value is that, even if they inexplicably and illogically possessed consciousness, rationality, and all of the previously mentioned requirements for both moral and theological significance, their life spans could easily be cut short by cataclysmic and extraterrestrial events (i.e., extinction-level asteroid impacts, gamma-ray bursts, super-volcanic eruptions, and many more), before they could potentially evolve into higher life forms. In their present state, microbial life forms most certainly do not possess any of these traits; this argument further reinforces my criticism.

 

In conclusion, I hope to have encouraged readers to reconsider White’s argument and explore possible adjustments, ensuring this important conversation continues. What is clear is that White’s arguments, and the arguments for and against fine-tuning, deserve such consideration given its life explaining implications. Even though I am only 14 years old, I have found that White’s paper and these discussions provide clarity amidst the complexities of the world using logic, mathematics, and reason as a compass. I hope that with this critique and preemptive rebuttal presented, we can all approach Roger White's argument with more nuance, identifying the strengths, and contradictions within his claims. This allows us to reevaluate our positions and explore alternate solutions to the fine-tuning argument beyond positing a creator. Thus, if one chooses to maintain belief in a creator, it remains essential that one’s view is grounded in logical reasoning and consistent evidence.